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THE PRESIDENCY AND CONGRESSt
CHARLES

L. BLACK, JR.*

In the summer of 1930, an Austin, Texas, family which was desperate as to how to deal with a nearly fifteen-year-old boy sent him
to a place called then - and for all I know still called - Camp Dixie

for Boys in Wiley, Georgia. From that camp toward the end of its
season - a season mercifully long from my parents' point of view there went out, for those who wanted it and whose parents would pay
for it, an expedition called the Virginia trip. And so, nearly forty-five
years ago, and only some sixty years after General Lee's death, I was
in this Chapel, feeling all those feelings a Southern boy of those times
must feel in such a spot. Later, I considered coming back here to
college, but instead slid down the path of least resistance into what
we called in Texas "The University." But I must, after all, have had
a rendezvous, for here I am at last, and most pleased and honored to
be here.
In another way, time has circled. My first chief in law, John W.
Davis, still actively in charge when I worked for his firm, inaugurated
this lecture series.
I am to talk to you on "The Presidency and Congress." I cannot
believe that you expect anything wholly new from me, for so much
has been said on this subject of late, by me and by very many others, I
that anything really new must almost necessarily be foolish. But I will
tThe John Randolph Tucker Lecture, delivered at Washington & Lee University,
May 10, 1975.
*Henry R. Luce Professor of Jurisprudence, Yale Law School, Yale University,
New Haven, Conn. B.A. (1935), M.A. (1938), University of Texas; L.L.B. (1943), Yale
University.
1I think here especially of my students, particularly those in my Constitutional
Law Seminar, John Adney, Ed Geffner, David Martin, Robert Mintz, Chuck Patrizia,
John Pottenger and Richard Zuckerman. In the quick interchanges of ideas in such a
seminar, it is impossible to remember or sometimes even to ascertain origin. Of course,
the responsibility is entirely my own.
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try a somewhat different approach, a special kind of overview of our
Constitution, coming to my topic rather indirectly.
I have a problem or puzzle I take up with my students in Constitutional Law. You might call it a sort of game. I hope it is an instructive
game, though the thrust of its instructiveness must be toward insights rather than toward concrete inferences. What we do is try to
identify-the irreducible minimum of the American Constitution, and
so, we hope, to see further into what modem grammarians might call
its deep structure. We ask ourselves how much of our Constitution
was and is indispensable to the formation and continuance of the
government - how much of the Constitution is basically constitutive
and how much is either non-essential limitation or detail work.
Generally, to a fair degree of approximation, the answer is that
what was indispensably necessary was Article I. With some changes
in detail - changes mainly or entirely made necessary only by the
fact that a few provisions in Article I refer forward to other articles
- a complete, ongoing government, with all necessary organs, could
have been formed, and could have functioned down to now, if the
Constitution had ended at the end of Article I. On the other hand,
out of the remaining six Articles, or any part or combinations thereof,
or even any somewhat altered versions thereof, no government at all
could have been formed.
Article VII may be discarded at once, as functus officio on the
coming into force of the Constitution. Article V facilitates amendment, to be sure, but amendment, which now requires something
near a full consensus, would in the nature of the case have been
possible by unanimous consent of the States without any express
provision; in any event, Congress has under its Article I powers mainly commerce and taxation - accomplished much which might
have seemed more naturally to be accomplished by amendment, and
would undoubtedly in this way have accomplished even more if the
amendment power had not existed. Consider the paradigm of
Katzenbach v. McClung,I and the Civil Rights Act of 1964,1 where the
Commerce Clause was used copiously to accomplish what it was
feared the Fourteenth Amendment, which seemed to speak so much
more naturally to the issues, could not accomplish. Since patents and
copyrights are constitutionally based,4 one might have thought trademarks would also have to be constitutionally based, and would need
to be given this basis by amendment, after the first Trade Mark
2379 U.S. 294 (1964).
342 U.S.C. § 2000a et seq. (1970).
'U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.

1975]

TUCKER LECTURE

Cases.5 Not at all; the commerce clause, our constitutional equivalent
of the untraversable allegation of breach of the King's peace, was
available and availed.' No constitutional amendment put narcotics
under national control; the taxing power was enough. 7 It seems quite
clear that, as a mere matter of constitutional law, slavery could have
been abolished by use of the commerce and taxing powers, and after
the Civil War who would have said nay? I dare even speculate that,
after that war, if Article I had been all we had, Congress, within the
field of force of its naturalization power, might have made citizens
of the freedmen, and, by the same token, of course could have granted
them the privileges and immunities of citizenship, if, indeed, that
were not thought to have been accomplished by the mere step of
making them citizens. Reconstruction, moreoever, might have taken
a different form if the device had not been available of compelling
assent to the three great post-Civil War Amendments. Here, however,
I have no desire to force my argument. It may have been a good thing
to have an Article V - but an entirely viable government could have
lived without it. In some ways, it might have been a better government; we could not, for example, have put beyond legislative reach
the provisions of the Twenty-fifth Amendment, the first and quite
ridiculous result of which - and perhaps the only result for a
hundred years - was that a President already deeply suspect, and
rather obviously on his way out, got to appoint his own successor.
As to Articles IV and VI, we have to do here with miscellaneous
provisions. I should think it fairly plain that the substance of the Full
Faith and Credit Clause could and would have been enacted by Congress under its Article I powers, as an obviously desirable if not obviously necessary facilitation of "Commerce among the several
States," as that phrase has been interpreted. The same would have
been true, I think, of the Article IV interstate "privileges and immunities" clause. The extradition clause can scarcely have been necessary, as it is not enforced and has been judicially declared unenforceable; in any case, interstate compacts, validated by Article I, could
and certainly would have taken care of the matter. The Fugitive
Slave Clause, if you like that sort of thing, could, again, have been
enacted by Congress, just as the Fugitive From Justice Act 8 has been
enacted, under the commerce power. The power of Congress to admit
5100 U.S. 82 (1879).
'United Drug Co. v. Theodore Rectanus Co., 248 U.S. 90, 98 (1918); Thaddeus
Davids Co. v. Davids Mfg. Co., 233 U.S. 461 (1914).
7
United States v. Doremus, 296 U.S. 86 (1919).
818 U.S.C. § 1073 (1970).
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new States would, against the background of the Northwest Ordinance, seem to be something to be taken for granted, as would the
right to make treaties, and the proprietary clause would seem to be
a mere spelling out of a power obviously implied by the mere existence of a national government; the ownership and management of
property would, moreover, fall so clearly under the "implied" or "instrumental" powers doctrine of McCulloch v. Maryland' as to need
no structural justification and certainly no explicit statement.
Since we have never acted under the "republican Form of Government" clause, and since no State has ever shown any disposition to
have anything but a republican form of government, that clause is
presumably dispensable.
As to Article VI, Congress, as an incident to its Article I power to
tax and spend for the general welfare, and to borrow money on the
credit of the United States, plainly could have assumed the prior
debts of the Confederation, for the clearing of the credit of the United
States would rather obviously be a step facilitating further borrowing.
The requirement of the oath of support of the Constitution could
beyond question have been imposed by Congress on federal officers,
but I should think that the imposing of such an oath on state officers
as well, by Act of Congress, would have been a means clearly "proper" to the assurance of obedience to the laws passed under Article
I. Congress could perhaps have required a "religious test" for office
had any American Congress ever been disposed to do so; our only real
''religious test," the rule that no Roman Catholic might be President,
was imposed by what was guessed as to the wishes of the electorate,
and was repealed by the electorate in 1960. This leaves the celebrated
Supremacy Clause - but, without that clause, could there ever have
been any doubt of the supremacy of national over state law? Is such
supremacy not irresistibly implied in Article I, § 10, wherein the
Constitution speaks as with authority over state law? Without any
Supremacy Clause, would it not have been merely frivolous, for example, to contend that a state law could prevail over a congressional
regulation of commerce? True, without the Supremacy Clause as
worded, treaties might not have had with us, as they have not with
the British, any independent force as municipal law - unless and
until Congress, which under Article I is in charge both of foreign
commerce and of war, subjects to which virtually all treaties are
ancillary, might have given them that force - generally or one at a
time. The position would not have been greatly different in theory to
what it is now, for Congress can by simple statute deprive a treaty of
'17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
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its municipal-law force,10 so that the difference, even in the absence
of a general statute giving such force to self-executing treaties, would
have been one between a condition precedent and a condition subsequent.
Now all this is propaedeutic, or brush-clearing, to the seriously
constitutive parts of the Constitution as it stands - Articles I, II, and
I. It will be useful, perhaps, to look at Article Iin confrontation with
each of the other two, and I will start with the third article.
That short article provides for a federal judiciary - or does it?
Well it does it, if it does, in a most imperfect way. As to the lower
federal courts, they are to be such as Congress may "ordain and
establish;" the words "from Time to Time" are added, in a document
not remarkable for its verbosity, as though to remind us that Congress is free not only to refrain from establishing a lower federal
judiciary, but to change its mind about this matter, or about any of
the details of this matter, "from Time to Time." A "supreme Court"
is to be sure, in some imperfect sense, established by the very force
of the Article - but how infirm a foundation! Congress is to say and did say - how many judges there were to be - and it has
changed its mind on this "from Time to Time." Congress is to say
what the compensation of these judges shall be, and Congress, it was
early and correctly assumed, is to say when and where the Court shall
sit. The Senate - as we learn, if we steal a look at Article II - has
to confirm each judge before he is commissioned. It was and is up to
Congress to provide this Court with a meeting place, and with those
officers without which no court can function.
Moreover, the all-important appellate jurisdiction of this "supreme Court" is to be exercised, within the enumerated case over
which the judicial power extends, "with such Exceptions, and under
such Regulations as the Congress shall make."
Let me digress concerning this provision. I know that there are
people who would see in it much less than it appears to say. It seems
to me to say that Congress may make any exceptions it regards as
wise to the appellate jurisdiction of the Court. For my part, I stand
with Herbert Wechsler on this question," and see no ground at all,
none at all, for importing exceptions into this "exceptions" power. I
would only add, very briefly, two arguments. First, the Court itself
has been empowered by Congress, through the conferring of the discretionary certiorari jurisdiction, to make, from time to time, "exceptions" to its own jurisdiction, on any unstated prudential ground that
I The Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. 581 (1889).
"Wechsler, The Courts and the Constitution, 65 Colum. L. R. 1001 (1965).
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appeals to it, and not necessarily on grounds sounding in the legal
merits; it has done this many times, not only because tendered issues
were thought trivial, but in some cases quite obviously because it
thought the time inopportune for decision on the merits of some
clearly non-trivial issue. This control of jurisdiction, on grounds not
sounding in law but merely in time-allocation or political prudence
for the time being, is hardly a full-bodied judicial function. I find
myself more comfortable with it when I think of it as the exercise by
the Court of an "exceptions" power quite reasonably delegated to the
Court by Congress. In any case, it does, without creating any clamor,
exactly what those who would limit Congress' "exceptions" power say
is forbidden - it denies, without so much as reason given, and with
no reason in law necessary, review of some federal constitutional
claims in the Supreme Court, and sometimes in any federal court. I
do not understand how it could be right for the Court to be given by
Congress this quite literally extra-legal power, while at the same time
Congress, expressly given an "exceptions" power as to the Court's
appellate jurisdiction, cannot exercise that power on classes of cases
which, for prudential reasons, it thinks ought not to come to the
Court.
Secondly, there is reason primarily of a political kind, but going
to interpretation. Except for the original jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court, every assumption of jurisdiction by every federal court since
1789 has been on the basis of an Act of Congress giving jurisdiction
to that court. This, it seems to me, is the rock on which rests the
legitimacy of the judicial work in a democracy. Of course such Acts
have required and continually do require interpretation, but any interpretation objected to by Congress is known to be changeable by
Congress. The integral sum of all this process is that the federal
courts take jurisdiction because Congress tells them to, and do not
take jurisdiction when Congress tells them not to - as best they can
interpret the Congressional command, with Congress free to correct
that interpretation. Now suppose Congress, in language of unmistakeable clarity, forbade the Supreme Court to hear on appeal some
identifiable class of cases, and suppose the Court, convinced by the
arguments of the exceptions-to-"exceptions" school, took jurisdiction
nevertheless, holding the exceptive act unconstitutional. And suppose Congress in its turn disagreed, reading the Constitution, as I
would read it, to give it full power to make such "exceptions" as it
thinks prudent to the Court's appellate jurisdiction. Why should
Congress accept the Court's view? Why should any officer of government accept the Court's view? The Congressional view would be that
the Court had acted without jurisdiction, in the face of the constitu-
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tional language, and without pretense of following Congress' directions, and that a judgment thus outside the Court's jurisdiction was
a mere nullity. I fear (and I choose the word carefully) that I would
have to agree. An interpretation producing this impasse is not acceptable.
I think, finally - and this is not so much a legal as a tactical
argument - that those people are very badly mistaken who think
they strengthenthe position of the Court by arguing that its jurisdiction is outside congressional control. The root objection to the Court's
power of constitutional review is that it is undemocratic - an objection not subject to facile dismissal on grounds only of what was intended in Philadelphia in 1787. It seems to me that the most effective
answer to this objection is and always has been that the Court could
have been and still can be curbed by Congress, in many ways, and
not only under the "Exceptions and Regulations" power, and that
Congress, with this power to curb, has not only refrained almost
entirely from using it, but has in several crucial Acts accepted this
judicial function. I am not sure that I could defend, as consistent with
the postulates of democracy, a system which really did put nine men,
with life tenure, in an absolutely invulnerable position of final power.
I am very sure that the designation of such a government as one of
"checks and balances" would be quite absurd.
I read Article III, then, as laying the basis for a federal judiciary,
but for a federal judiciary very largely subject, as to jurisdiction and
procedure, to Congress' authority. But even if you do not wholly agree
with this, I think you will, on reflection, agree that Article I, on the
basis of established constitutional doctrine, was quite unnecessary to
the creation of a federal judiciary. For if McCulloch v. Maryland'2 is
right, and Congress is empowered to create and use such means as
are needful for the carrying into effect of its legislation, and if Congress has choice among all arguably reasonable and not expressly
prohibited means, then nothing could be clearer than that Congress
might have set up pretty much the sort of judiciary we actually have,
and would almost certainly have done so. Congress would not, of
course, have been obligated to give the judges life tenure, but neither
is the British Parliament so obligated. The Parliament has done so,
and stuck to it; I think it probable that Congress would have done
the same.
One could view Article III, then, not as a necessary basis for the
creation of a federal judiciary, but rather as a set of definite but not
217

U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
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absolutely essential limitations on Congress' control over the nature
and empowerment of that judiciary, and as a moral bolstering of the
position of the judges. And I think it interesting that, even to people
who, like me, think those limitations to be rather sparse, and who
think Congress has wide power over the federal judiciary, the
practical reasons for its moderating its own use of that power would
have been just the same if the power to create the judiciary had
flowed directly from Article I. Herbert Wechsler, again, has enumerated then, and I cannot do better than to quote from him:
To begin with, government cannot be run without the use of
courts for the enforcement of coercive sanctions and within
large areas it will be thought that federal tribunals are essential to administer federal law. Within that area, the opportunity for litigating constitutional defenses is built in and cannot
be foreclosed. The same necessity for federal tribunals will be
felt in many situations that do not involve proceedings for
enforcement; it has led Congress in recent years to expand
remedial jurisdiction by such measures as the Federal Declaratory Judgment Act, the Tucker Act, the Administrative Procedure Act and others I could name. The withdrawal of such
jurisdiction would impinge adversely on so many varied interests that its durability can be assumed. Beyond this, if the
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court alone is withdrawn in a
given field, as happened in McCardle, issues are left to final
resolution in the lower courts, which may, of course, reach
contrary results in different sections of the country. If, in addition, all federal jurisdiction is withdrawn, the resolution is
perforce left to the courts of fifty states, with even greater
probability of contrariety in their decisions. How long would
you expect such inconsistency in the interpretation of the
law of the United States to be regarded as a tolerable situation? ...
These are the reasons why congressional control of jurisdiction has so rarely been exerted as a method of expressing dissidence to constitutional decisions, even when such dissidence
has won the sympathy of Congress . . . . The federal system
needs federal courts and the judicial institution needs an organ
of supreme authority.13
If this last sentence is true - and I see no possible doubt of its
3

Wechsler, supra note 11, at 1006-07.

1975]

TUCKER LECTURE

truth - then we can be reasonably sure that any Congress constituted by a lone-standing Article I would of necessity have created a
federal judiciary much like the one we have.
Now let us try this sort of thinking on Article I, in which we are
primarily interested today. First, let us examine Article II critically,
to see what foundation it gives to the independent powers of the
Presidency. (Here I have to repeat myself to some extent, hoping new
hearers and readers will be reached; Article II remains the same
Article II, however many times one examines it.)
The fact is (freshly surprising, perhaps, to those who have not
recently read Article II) that, as far as the text takes us, the President
has very little power of his own. His treaty-making power is in the
hands of the Senate. He has a power of appointment, but this power
is not only in the hands of the Senate but also is a power to appoint
people to fill such offices as Congress may create, paid and otherwise
materially supported as Congress chooses. He is commander-in-chief
of the armed forces, but Congress is empowered to raise these and to
provide for their maintenance, and to make regulations for their governance. Underlying all these limitations is the financial one - the
so-called "Presidency" has firm constitutional claim only to an undiminished salary for the President; all else is at the discretion of Congress, and is freshly at hazard in every new general appropriations
act.
True, we have never come quite to rest on the question of the
existence of a general "executive" power, but it is at least reasonable
to hold that such power is at best interstitial and ancillary to the
policy-forming powers of Congress. If Congress held such a view in
good faith, then it might in good faith use any of the ample and quite
irresistible means at its disposal to see to it that the general "executive power" was employed only in these interstitial and ancillary
ways - and it could of course, narrow the interstices at will.
I would conclude, therefore, that what Article II sets up is an
"executive" branch very largely under congressional control,
whenever Congress generates the initiative and will to control it. If I
am right in this, then the Article II situation is parallel to the Article
HI situation, and also resembles it in that Congress, had the Constitution ended at the end of Article I, might and probably would have
chosen to establish, as a generally available means to the attainment
of its legislative ends, an "executive" much like the Presidency we
know.
Here again I think we have something like corroboration from
actual history. For the modem Presidency, as it actually exists, is
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very largely a creation of Congress. The modern powers of the Presidency are derived in principal part from delegations by Congress to
the President. The President's assumption of powers not expressly so
delegated might, moreover, easily be nullified by Congress. Article II
created a one-man executive, and provided the manner of his choosing - but Congress has the continuing power to make and unmake
the empowerment of the office. On both these scores, it seems to me
that Congress is led to the delegation I have mentioned by a fatality
visible in its effects even without insight into its causes. As a
museum-piece example, take the War Powers Resolution. 4 Presented
as a limitation on presidential power, this Resolution can hardly be
read as other than a very nearly explicit authorization of any presidential action whatever, with Congress exercising supervisory power
later along, after the commitment has been made.
As I have briefly indicated already, it would seem that the historic
fatality that has brought about, and continues to bring about, these
abundant delegations, would have sufficed, even if the Constitution
had ended at the end of Article I, to motivate the creation by Congress of an executive branch, and to delegate to it much the same
powers it has delegated to the President. The Article of Confederation
Congress was struggling with this problem, and moving toward a
solution; a newly and more widely empowered Congress, under the
present Article I, would almost certainly have solved it by creating
an executive for the very purpose of carrying on government in a
continuous manner. Having created such an executive, Congress
would in all likelihood have delegated power to it much as it has to
the President, because the reasons and motives for such delegation
would have been just the same.
What are those reasons? I have pointed out elsewhere that the
main general reason lies in the constitution of Congress itself, as
spelled out by Article I. The short truth is that, while many institutional factors might lead a Congressman or a Senator to want to get
along with his party leadership in the House or the Senate respectively the continuance of his political career rests altogether in the
hands of his constituency, of which he cannot be deprived by anybody
in Washington, and which (as experience has shown) cannot be much
influenced by anybody in Washington. This iron law works on all
Congressmen, regardless of the safety of their seats. The Congressman or Senator with a district or state safe for himself has little to
fear from the congressional party leadership. On the other hand, the
Congressman or Senator in a more marginal situation with respect to
'"87 Stat. 555 (1973).
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his constituency is so much the more motivated to please that constituency. This does not mean, of course, that any Congressman or
Senator must or will himself act against his own conscience to bring
about his own reelection. It does mean that in the fairly short run a
match will be found between the views of a constituency and the
conscience of its representative. And, much more important for the
present purpose, it means that the power of effective discipline, absolutely necessary for leadership, is not and can never be lodged in the
party leadership in either House, except perhaps by historical accident for very brief periods.
The paradox then arises than the organ beyond doubt authorized
to form policy has a great and continuing difficulty in forming national policy adequately freed of local interests, or in organizing itself
to form and pursue consistent policy at all. What is more natural than
that such a body, knowing its own limitations, should repeatedly look
to the President for leadership both in the formation and in the execution of policy?
So far I have not mentioned the one large and genuinely intrusive
foreign body in an Article I which could have been a Constitution in
itself. I refer, of course, to the veto. This is a vital intrusion because
the veto, I think, makes entirely impossible any reliance on the continuing formation of independent congressional policy, since it makes
it necessary that such policy command the support of stable twothirds majorities in both Houses, as against a resolutely opposed
President. Vetoes may be overridden by an angry Congress, on some
particularly wanted legislatior. But vetoes in overwhelming majority
are not overridden, and as long as this institution exists it will greatly
strengthen the power of the President over policy.
I have elsewhere suggested that it might be possible that Congress, for non-party institutional reasons, might develop a convention
that vetoes invariably be overridden. This is not impossible, and no
one can say whether, over the decades and centuries, it may not
develop - particularly as those members who support the President's
veto on the merits would only have to absent themselves from the
overriding vote, and would not have to vote against their consciences.
But I see no signs of the emergence of such a convention, and it seems
likely that the merits of the individual occasion will continue to dominate in the foreseeable future.
While I am on the veto, I would like to make one somewhat subsidiary but I think very important point. Let me take you back to the
question of the existence of a general "executive power." Without
going into details, let me just say that I join the school of thought
which would make the extent of such a power, or even its existence
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in most cases, depend largely on the presence or absence of a Congressional determination covering the same policy ground. I take it that
if one counts judges, instead of puzzling over the question why some
judges who obviously did not believe in it joined the majority opinion,
that is the general teaching of the Youngstown Steel case.' 5
Mr. Justice Jackson's opinion in that case"6 makes the distinctions
most clearly. He discerns an ever-narrowing ambit of "executive"
power as one progresses from the case where Congress has authorized
or supported the presidential action, through the case where Congress
has not spoken, to the end-case of express congressional disapproval
of the presidential action. This seems to me a sensible spectrum for
its purpose. But it leaves unanswered one question: Suppose "Congress," in the narrow sense of "House and Senate," disapproves of
some Presidential action, and expresses its disapproval unambiguously either in a Joint Resolution which is vetoed and not passed
by override, or in a Concurrent Resolution which simply expresses
congressional opinion, without having the force of law, and so is not
submitted for veto.
What if anything does this do, in Justice Jackson's frame of reference, to the "executive power?" I think it arguable that independent
executive power ought to be seen as greatly constricted under these
circumstances. I think it too hasty a dismissal to say that this view
violates Article I, Section 7, in that it gives force as law to a "resolution" of Congress not approved by the President. I own the question
is a close one, but I believe that the view just mentioned confuses the
issue. The final question, after all, is whether the President's independent exercise of "executive power" is to have the force of law. The
affirmative argument usually has to be that Congress has formulated
no policy for dealing with the presented subject matter. If the Senate
and House actually have formulated and agreed on policy, even to the
extent of disapproving a presidential step, then this seems to me, veto
or no veto, necessarily to alter the factual and political background
out of which the presidential power must emerge.
I think occasion might well arise when this could be tried. If it is,
and if a justifiable case arises, I would hope that a court would hold
that the fact of congressional disapproval, in the narrow sense I have
mentioned, had great effect on the propriety of independent presidential action. If this is not to be so, then the President is in the (to me)
paradoxical position of being able to claim the necessity of interstitial
or emergency action because of congressional inaction, when he him'343 U.S. 579 (1952).
"Id. at 634.
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self, by his veto, has produced this situation. But I must close this
digression.
When I was lecturing in Asia recently, I offered as one topic - and
it was often chosen - "The Location of Leadership in the American
Polity." By the time I had finished, the talk really had been about
"The Non-Location of Leadership in the American Polity." I told my
Far Eastern audiences that they, as students of the Book of Changes,
might be less surprised than would the minds of the West at the
fading of a topic into its opposite. That is what I have really been
talking about today. The American polity is so set up as not to generate leadership.
That is, I think, the real point of the game I described in the
beginning. So strong is the position of Congress that we might easily
have had a complete government if the Framers had stopped at the
end of Article I. Yet Congress is so incapable, organically, of leadership that we can conjecture quite plausibly that something very like
the presidency and the judiciary, built and empowered as we now
know them, would have come into being anyway - brought into
being by necessity, and created by a fully empowered Congress to fill
the needs it could not itself hope to fill.
A government so structured must be, under all normal circumstances, leaderless. It must be a government of compromise, of conciliation, of continual redistribution and relocation of temporary power,
a government of hundreds of new alignments for new problems and
times. To my Far Eastern friends, this made the whole enterprise look
rather hopeless. Yet, I urge you, as I did them, to consider that this
Constitution has lasted a long time, and stood many strains. It is an
experiment trying, amongst other things, whether constitutionally
confirmed leadership is really necessary to political success. I hope it
keeps on working, and I tremblingly believe that it will.
I hope nothing I have said will be interpreted as an assertion of
the unimportance of Articles II and IlI. But I believe their importance
rises, most paradoxically but truly, out of the fact that they were not
necessary - that the bare logic of the government could have been
much the same without them. For they embody thus the more clearly
a moral foundation for the independent executive and judicial
branches. That independence can exist, as it could have existed without these Articles, only through congressional deference. But these
Articles make such deference a part of the unwritten American Constitution, the Constitution we have lived by. The deference to the
judiciary suggested by Article II is currently not in danger - indeed
the danger there is of an opposite character. But I believe a newly
healthy American government will arise only when the deference to
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the President suggested by Article I is resumed, perhaps re-formed
- when we have, in other words, ceased from the foolish course of
trying to create a legal and political regime for the Presidency which
fits only an unworthy and deeply distrusted President.
As I finish, I have a sense of only having skimmed the surface or rather, a very small part of the surface. There is much more I could
say, and much more that is there that I cannot yet say clearly. Understanding of the dynamics of the American system does not come
easily. I am pretty sure nobody has yet understood it through and
through, and I doubt anybody ever will. I only hope my remarks today
may lead you to think about it somewhat freshly.

